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Verteidigungsreform in der Ukraine: Chronologie der ersten fünf Jahre 
Bericht des BIOst Nr. 29/1998 
Kurzfassung 
Vorbemerkung 
Als aktiver Partner im 'Programm für Partnerschaft und Frieden' hat die Ukraine sich zur 
'Transparenz' in einigen Schlüsselbereichen der zivilen-militärischen Beziehungen und der 
Verteidigung verpflichtet. Das Land kann seinen Partnern allerdings wenig wertvolle 
Informationen liefern, da seine militärischen Pläne, Programme und das Finanzierungssystem 
noch im Anfangsstadium stecken. Außerdem ist die zivile Führung der Ukraine noch nicht 
bereit, das Militär unter die volle demokratische, zivile Kontrolle zu unterstellen. Dieser 
Bericht will die verschiedenen Aspekte der Beziehungen zwischen Militär und den zivilen 
Behörden sowie der Verteidigungsreformen in der Ukraine untersuchen. Hierbei tritt eine 
wichtige Dimension der Beziehungen zwischen zivilen und militärischen Bereichen in 
Erscheinung: Parallel zu den Streitkräften existieren einige andere bewaffnete Strukturen und 
schaffen viele zusätzliche Hindernisse auf dem Weg zum Aufbau von erschwinglichen und 
nachhaltigen militärischen Strukturen. Diese Studie enthält Faktenmaterial in großem 
Umfang, wodurch die Entwicklung zwischen 1991 und 1996 gut nachvollzogen werden kann. 
Trends, Tendenzen und Widersprüche, die auf den ersten Blick nicht ersichtlich sind, können 
so herausgearbeitet werden. Die Hauptakteure und wichtigsten Persönlichkeiten, die im 
Planungsprozeß der Verteidigung eine wichtige Rolle spielen, werden vorgestellt. Die 
Untersuchung basiert auf einer Anzahl offizieller Verlautbarungen und zahlreicher 
ukainischer, russischer und westlicher Originalquellen. 
Ergebnisse 
1. Es steht noch bei weitem nicht bestens um die Beziehungen zwischen den zivilen und mili-
tärischen Bereichen in der Ukraine. Eigentlich ist die zivile Führung noch nicht bereit, das 
Militär ganz einer demokratischen zivilen Kontrolle zu unterstellen. 
2. Der Mangel an konstitutioneller Klarheit, an deutlich festgelegten Prioritäten der Innen- 
wie Außenpolitik sowie zahllose Brüche in der legislativen Grundlage eröffnen dem 
Militär einen großen Spielraum zwischen den exekutiven Strukturen und dem Parlament.  
3. Das Programm für Aufbau und Entwicklung der Streitkräfte steht im Zentrum der Bezie-
hungen zwischen zivilen und militärischen Behörden der Ukraine. Ohne eine nationale und 
militärische Verteidigungsstrategie, ohne zivile Vorgaben für die finanziellen Aspekte des 
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Programms, ohne grundlegende Kenntnis der Ziele und Aufgaben der ukrainischen Streit-
kräfte, kann ein solches Programm unmöglich erstellt werden. 
4. Außerordentlich wichtig ist die Frage des Umfangs des ukrainischen Militärs. Die Ukraine 
ist in einer sehr viel schwierigeren Lage als andere europäische Länder. Es gibt hier eine 
Million bewaffneter Truppen, aber nur 370 000 davon dienen in der Armee. Die anderen 
militärischen Strukturen – die Nationalgarde, die Grenztruppen, die zivilen 
Verteidigungsformationen, der Sicherheitsdienst, die Truppen des Inneren usw. – haben 
Ziele und Aufgaben, die sich zum Teil mit denen der Streitkräfte überschneiden. Es wäre 
also unsinnig, nur die Armee zu reformieren, ohne Ziele und Aufgaben neu zu verteilen 
und ohne alle staatlichen militärischen Organisationen der Ukraine miteinzubeziehen. 
5. Obwohl in den letzten fünf bis sechs Jahren die meisten der notwendigen konstitutionellen 
und institutionellen Vorbereitungen für eine demokratische zivile Kontrolle über die Streit-
kräfte in der Ukraine getroffen wurden, so existiert sie gegenwärtig doch nur als Form. Es 
wäre unbedingt notwendig, die Form mit dem geeigneten Inhalt zu füllen oder, in anderen 
Worten, ihr 'Leben einzuhauchen'. Nur dann kann man hoffen, daß die Ukraine in den 
kommenden Jahren in der Lage sein wird, ein wirksames und nachhaltiges System einer 
verläßlichen demokratisch-zivilen Kontrolle über das Militär aufzubauen. 
6. Man kann die Form der Beziehungen zwischen den zivilen und militärischen Behörden mit 
Inhalt füllen, in dem man wissenschaftlich – oder doch zumindest systematisch – an die 
Schaffung eines solchen Systems herangeht. Es ist daher von ausschlaggebender 
Bedeutung für die Ukraine, eine Methodologie für die Reform der Armee zu entwickeln, 
wenn möglich bis hin zur Ebene der Prüflisten. Nur so kann eine verläßliche 
demokratische zivile Kontrolle über das Militär errichtet werden. 
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Introduction 
Ukraine, strategically located in the heartland of the European continent – given its vast terri-
tory, population, resources, and its special relations with NATO, with the Russian Federation 
and with other CIS countries – will play a important role in the future European security 
architecture. 
As an active participant in the NATO 'Partnership for Peace' programme, Ukraine has 
committed itself to a 'transparency' in some key areas of civil-military relations and defence, 
such as defence planning, defence budgeting, and weapon systems acquisition. However, the 
country has little valuable information to share among the partners, because its military 
planning, programming and budgeting systems are still in their embryonic stage. 
This study is devoted to analysing the different aspects of civil-military relations and defence 
reform in Ukraine. It has few distinct features that differ it from not so vast literature on the 
subject. First, it looks at the same issue from a slightly different standpoint; that is the 
effectiveness of the Ukraine's state policy towards the military. Most experts analyse the issue 
of civilian control over the Armed Forces, mainly, by looking at the military. Moreover, the 
main question (they often keep in mind) is the loyalty of the Armed Forces to the civilian 
authorities. As will be demonstrated, the approach used in this study helps the reader to get a 
deeper understanding of the problems Ukraine is trying to tackle. 
Secondly, the study reveals a very important aspect of civil-military relations in Ukraine, that 
is, in the author's words, the dimensional aspect. It becomes clear for the reader, that in the 
case of Ukraine one ought to pay much more attention even to the term 'military' as normally 
used in any other country. Existing in parallel to the Armed Forces a few other armed struc-
tures (numbering almost twice as many servicemen) create many additional obstacles on the 
path of establishing a stable, affordable and sustainable military structure in Ukraine. 
Thirdly, the paper contains vast factual material that helps to follow the development of 
events since 1991. Analysis of the material also allows to single out some trends, tendencies, 
contradictions, proportions and disproportion, invisible at first sight. In addition, the role of 
the key players and personalities, involved in the defence planning process, is being revealed. 
Finally, the study discusses some general issues regarding the state transformation in Ukraine 
and regarding the substance of civil-military relations. In this sense, the research stimulates a 
further study in order to develop a methodological (scientific) approach applicable to the 
country-in-transition from the post-communist stage to democracy. 
The paper contains an introduction, two separate chapters (each in turn subdivided into three 
sections), and a conclusion. 
Chapter 1 The Problem and Its Origins starts with a short historical flashback into 1991-1997, 
touching upon the post-Soviet legacy that is a starting point for the building of Ukraine's own 
system of civil-military relations. Different aspects are being studied to understand the peculi-
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arity of the situation in Ukraine. One needs to know the patient, his symptoms in order to ar-
rive at a diagnosis and recommend 'a course of treatment.' 
The second section continues with an analysis of the aforementioned dimensional aspect of 
the issue. The author argues, that Ukraine is in a much more difficult situation than other 
European countries if one considers that it has more than a million armed people and only 
about 370,000 of them serve in the Armed Forces. Almost twice as many belong to other 
armed structures, such as the National Guard, the Border Troops, the Civil Defence 
formations, the Security Service, the Interior Troops, and so forth. Each of these structures 
has missions and tasks that overlap with those of the Armed Forces. It is impossible (and 
unwise) to reform just the Armed Forces without the redistribution of missions and tasks and 
without optimising the whole state military structure in Ukraine. The last part of the chapter is 
devoted to the 'young' Defence Ministry of Ukraine that fights for its fair 'share of the pie' in a 
rather competitive environment, being surrounded by other (more powerful) military 
structures. 
Chapter 2 The Failure to Address the Problem provides an analysis of the State programme 
(for the Armed Forces build-up and development) drafting, review and approval process. It 
also touches upon issues such as a civilian Defence Minister and the professional Armed 
Forces in Ukraine. 
The programme for the Armed Forces build-up and development has become the focus of civ-
il-military relations in Ukraine. Four consecutive Defence Ministers tried to develop and get 
it approved. The author believes it is impossible to form it without a clear vision of the 
national interests, strategic objectives, national and military security strategy without 
financial and programme guidance from the civilian side; without an understanding of 
substance of missions and tasks of the Armed Forces. The main message of the piece is that 
lack of clear guidance and contradictory wording at the top level lead to rather chaotic and 
unsuccessful attempts at the middle level and in the final analysis – to the prolonged suffering 
at the bottom level. 
In 1994 there was hope, that the appointment of Valeriy Shmarov as a civilian Defence 
Minister would represent a new state of civil-military relations in Ukraine. It turned out to be 
a failure. Now Ukraine has already the fourth Defence Minister (for only few years of 
independent development), not to mention also four chiefs of the General Staff for the same 
period. Political instability and lack of institutionalised civil service provoke a situation when 
high and middle level authorities come and go producing no system, no continuity and no 
results in the long-term. There is an attempt to answer the question, whether the Ukrainian 
two-year 'experiment' with a civilian Defence Minister was an unreasoned or premature step. 
The prospect of the professional Armed Forces in Ukraine is under discussion in the last 
section of the chapter. 
The essential message is that Ukraine has the opportunity of obtaining either a successful re-
sult, or prolonging the current crisis into the indefinite future with quite predictable conse-
quences. It seems, that some recent positive developments in Ukraine have created a situation 
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where there is more demand for and more acceptance of logical and reasonable proposals, 
ideas, and concepts. 
Contributions of others to the completion of this study are gratefully acknowledged. I owe my 
greatest debt to Prof. Peter M.E. Volten, Dr. David Greenwood, and Dr. Joost Herman for 
their support of the research. I want to express my appreciation to my colleagues from the 
Centre for European Security Studies, who helped me with the bibliography and made a num-
ber of helpful criticisms: Margriet Drent, Theo Postma, Sipke de Hoop, and Janneke Westen-
dorp. I also thank my friends Elena Herman, Sergei Malkin, Leonid Polyakov, and Mykola 
Sungurovskiy for their valuable suggestions for the improvement of the manuscript. Finally, I 
thank my wife Liuda for her patience and very active support of my study. 
Chapter 1: The Problem and Its Origins 
1.1 Soviet Legacy: Starting Point and Humus for the System 
Ukraine was one of the first states of the former Soviet Union to embark on the establishment 
of its own Armed Forces, paying no attention to talks about the Unified Armed Forces of the 
CIS. Kiev did not sign the Tashkent Treaty, and Ukrainian leaders are now talking with pride 
about the fact that Ukrainian servicemen are not being killed in Tajikistan, Chechnya or other 
places defending foreign interests. It is true. On the other hand, even today, following numer-
ous attempts to reshape and restructure, Ukraine's Armed Forces cannot yet be called the 
Armed Forces in the full sense of the word. To find true reasons one needs, first, to return 
back to 1991 and look carefully at the legacy of the Soviet epoch; and secondly, to retrace 
new developments in Ukraine since 1991. Let us first return to the summer of 1991.1 
Ukraine inherited a huge Army, although that was not constructed to be the separate Armed 
Forces of the state. Until 1992, Ukrainian territory was divided among three Soviet Military 
Districts, totalling about 800,000 military personnel. One of the most powerful Soviet 
military formations was deployed in Ukraine: the aforesaid three Military Districts, three Air 
Armies, one Air Defence Army, 43rd Rocket Army, 34 military educational institutions, huge 
defence industry and the Black Sea Fleet2 with its enormous coastal infrastructure (although 
in dual subordination) obtained under Ukrainian jurisdiction. Soviet Armed Forces on 
Ukrainian territory belonged to the first strategic echelon and were therefore well trained and 
combat-capable. The total power of the armaments – tanks, armoured personnel carriers, 
                                                 
1 Other authors: Oleg Bodruk, Viktor Cherednichenko, Oleg Chornousenko, Charles Dick, John Dunn, Vadim 
Grechaninov, Taras Kuzio, Stephen Olynyk, Grygoriy Perepelytsa, Leonid Polyakov, James Sherr, Mykola 
Sungurovskiy, in particular – one way or another have already touched upon the issues of civil-military 
relations and defence reform in Ukraine. It would be enough just to recapitulate here some important points 
that help to understand the origins of the current problems in the sphere. 
2 In theory, the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) was a large and formidable force. In 1991 it comprised 45 combat 
vessels and 246 support vessels; 28 diesel-powered submarines; naval aviation support; a naval infantry bri-
gade; a motorised rifle division; and more than 50,000 navy personnel. Despite its size and strength, the BSF 
combat capabilities were rather limited. 
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artillery systems, intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, combat aircraft and 
helicopters – was rated as third in the world after the USA and the Russian Federation. 
Soviet Army grouping had a clear sense of mission and a high degree of internal cohesion al-
though within the overall structure directed from Moscow. It was a large and effective force 
more oriented towards large scale offensive operations outside Ukrainian territory. At the be-
ginning of 1992 it was pulled out of the relatively well-functioning (Soviet) military system 
with all further consequences. 
In the 'Declaration of State Sovereignty' Ukraine proclaimed its intention to become a non-nu-
clear state. In subsequent CIS agreements it reiterated this policy and soon began to transfer 
its tactical nuclear weapons to the Russian Federation for destruction. Already, in July 1992, 
all tactical nuclear warheads were transferred. After some zigzag moves Ukraine became a 
party of the Lisbon Protocol and of SALT-1 Treaty. In January 1994, the trilateral meeting in 
Moscow of the Presidents of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the United States, finally 
closed the nuclear page in Ukrainian history. Therefore, the future development of the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces would have to be based on conventional weapon systems. 
According to the international agreements, conventional weapons also had to undergo cut-
backs to the agreed levels. For Ukraine, these levels are 4,080 tanks, 5,050 armoured person-
nel carriers, 4,040 artillery systems of calibre over 100 mm, 1,090 combat aircraft and 330 
strike helicopters. Ukraine had already fulfilled its commitments by 1995, ahead of the agreed 
time. The aforementioned ceilings are high enough to allow the building of national Armed 
Forces. However, one must consider that the capabilities which Ukraine inherited decrease 
every year due to physical wearing out and technological backwardness of weapon systems. 
The Soviet institutional control consisted simply of Communist Party control (directly and 
through special services) at every level of the Armed Forces. This control was neither demo-
cratic, nor truly civilian. But it was real, well institutionalised, and very effective within the 
overall totalitarian state structure. Every military unit down to company level had its deputy 
commander for political affairs. In fact, professional advancement depended on political loy-
alty. Therefore, most officers and certainly almost all senior officers were members of the 
Communist Party. The break-up of the Soviet Union brought about the end of the old system 
of political control over the military. In addition, if one considers the lack of other elements of 
reliable, democratic civilian control (such as President, Parliamentary Defence Committee, 
Defence Ministry, other defence-related governmental structures, free media, academia, 
NGO, etc.) in the Ukrainian 'state' of the Soviet period, clearly, Ukraine had to start almost 
from scratch. 
Together with a huge Army Ukraine inherited a wide range of difficult problems: dedovshchi-
na (recruit hazing) and corruption; poor living conditions of officers and their families; poor 
motivation; violation of military discipline; draft evasion and so forth. In addition, record 
numbers of officers requested discharges from service, while more than 100,000 others were 
waiting in line for transfer to Ukraine from the other former Soviet republics. 
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To conclude, in 1991 Ukraine faced an extremely difficult task – firstly, to forge a national 
Armed Force out of chaotic and hypertrophied troops stationed on its territory; secondly, it 
had no established state institutions, no people neither militaries, nor civilians – capable of 
running the Armed Forces on their own; thirdly, no military industry capable of producing 
weaponry autonomously and no non-governmental 'component' of civilian control; in short, 
having almost nothing, but problems. 
1.2 System's Dimension: Army or Armies of Ukraine? 
Ukraine is in a much more difficult situation than that of other countries if one considers that 
it has more than a million armed people and only about 370,000 of them serve in the Armed 
Forces.3 Almost twice as many belong to other state institutions – the so called armed struc-
tures or power structures. 
Since 1991 a variety of militarised organisations have been created. Apart from those subordi-
nated to the Defence Ministry, i.e. the Ground Forces, the Air and Air Defence Forces and the 
Navy, there are also the Border Troops, the Interior Troops, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
troops, the National Guard units, the Security Service sub-units, the Civil Defence 
formations,4 the State Guard Service sub-units, the Tax Police and Custom Service sub-units, 
the State Communications Department sub-units, the Ukrainian National Space Agency units 
and other forces belonging to different ministries and agencies.5 
According to Major General Vilen Martyrosyan, further militarisation of Ukrainian society 
continues; a most powerful system of enforcement ministries and departments has been creat-
ed. At present there is one person in uniform per 25 taxpayers in Ukraine.6 Besides militarisa-
tion, other aspects (including the economic one) are very important, since the aforesaid forces 
can carry out various kinds of military tasks and to a certain extent they duplicate functions of 
the regular Armed Forces. In fact, step by step, high-cost and unpromising structures are 
being solidly ensconced and brought about behind a screen of concern for the future welfare 
of the country (and the Army). 
                                                 
3 On I January 1997 the Armed Forces of Ukraine numbered 370,847 of the military personnel. For more data 
see, S. Zgurets, 'Want Peace – Be Prepared for War,' Kiev DEN' in Ukrainian, 30 July 1997, p. 4. 
4 In 1996 the Civil Defence formations were re-subordinated to the newly established Ministry of Emergency 
of Ukraine. 
5 The notion of the 'State Military Organisation' as an umbrella for all these armed structures appears in 
Chapter 5 of the 'National Security Concept of Ukraine' adopted by the Parliament on 16 January 1997. The 
author of the paper, working as an MOD representative in the Parliamentary Defence Committee, presented 
the draft Chapter on behalf of his colleagues from the Military Security & Defence Studies Division. In fact, 
it was the first time this notion appeared in an official document of the Parliament. 
6 Maj-Gen V. Martyrosyan, 'What Kind of Minister Do We Need: In Uniform or Not?,' VECHIRNIY KYYIV 
in Ukrainian, 17 June 1994, p. 2. This article was written a few years ago. Since then the situation has got 
even worse. 
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One could cite the National Guard of Ukraine as an example. This was established according 
to the law in November 19917 on the basis of Interior Ministry troops. Later, a number of 
units and elements of the Armed Forces were incorporated into the National Guard. Now they 
number more than 30,000 servicemen8 in regular military units, special designation units and 
army aviation. The National Guard is an independent military formation, subordinated to the 
President. Analysis of the legislative documents9 shows that the National Guard's missions 
and tasks overlap with those of the Armed Forces, as well as with missions and tasks of the 
Internal Troops. Needless to say, contemporary Ukrainian leadership has the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces and other armed structures at its command. 
Speaking on prospects for further development of the National Guard, its Commander Lieu-
tenant General Ihor Valkiv said that the National Guard is moving towards integration of 
small separate sub-units into big military units.10 According to the General, these units are 
being enlarged, due to turning over to the National Guard of components which previously 
belonged to the Defence Ministry. Thus, only in 1996, did the National Guard take over the 
military units in Donetsk, Simferopol, Kerch and Pavlograd regions. 
The National Guard is equipped with tanks, armoured personnel carriers, anti-tank and air de-
fence artillery systems, combat and transport helicopters. In 1996, the 4th marine brigade 
(which previously belonged to the Ukrainian Naval Forces) stationed in Crimea, was turned 
over to the National Guard. As well as other armed structures, the National Guard has created 
its own sub-systems (or at least some of their elements) to provide logistics, military 
education and training, communications, command and control, intelligence, etc. For 
example, despite earlier approved plans to use the Defence Ministry's military institutes, 
officers for the National Guard are being trained at Kharkiv-based National Guard Institute. 
A similar picture is seen in other power structures of Ukraine. The Border Troops,11 for in-
stance, have their own Naval Forces with two-star Admiral in charge, own air and air defence 
components, own military academy, own command and control system based on three Border 
Districts,12 and so forth. Few attempts (to try) to unify the armed structures' approaches and 
                                                 
7 It was a very uncertain time, when the Soviet Army (subordinated to Moscow) was still on Ukrainian terri-
tory, and Ukrainian leadership had no military forces at its disposal. 
8 Zgurets, 'Want Peace .., Kiev DEN,' p. 4. According to the data presented, on 1 January 1997 the National 
Guard had 31,297 people. 
9 Colonel A. Grytsenko and Colonel (Retired) A. Gavrylov, Overlapping Missions and Military Tasks of the 
Ukrainian Armed Structures, the General Staff Research Centre, unpublished paper in Ukrainian, December 
1996, 16 p. 
10 Ukraine: National Guard Prepared To Defend Sensitive Installations, Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1411 
GMT, 4 November 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-215. 
11 On 1 January 1997 the Border Troops numbered 36,175 people. For more details see: S. Zgurets, Want 
Peace – Be Prepared for War, Kiev DEN' in Ukrainian, 30 July 1997, p. 4. 
12 When the Armed Forces left only two (out of three) Military Districts, the leadership of the Border Troops 
decided to rename their own (still) three Border Districts into the Operational Directions. The feeling was 
that it could be 'unfair' for the smaller military formation to have more districts than much bigger Armed 
Forces have. In fact, nothing was changed; and still the Commander of the Operational Direction in the 
Border Troops is a three-star general. 
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needs – in order to optimise the state military organisation and to minimise the resources re-
quired have so far proven to be fruitless. Frankly speaking, these attempts have not been 
persistent enough, and have mainly originated from the bottom. 
Volodymyr Mukhyn, Chairman of the Parliamentary Defence and State Security Committee 
shares his doubts on the state's ability to finance reforms simultaneously in different armed 
structures: 
It is envisaged that the (1997) budget of our Armed Forces will amount to H1.5 billion.13This 
is worrying, because the earmarked sum is even lower than last year's... The situation in the Se-
curity Service is no better... The Border Troops have ended up without equipment, fuel, and 
transport means as well.14 
Ukraine's north-eastern neighbour is probably the only other country faced with the similar 
problem of the mushrooming of numerous armed structures. According to former Russian De-
fence Minister Igor Rodyonov: 
…practically few parallel armies have been created (in the Russian Federation), with their own 
command structures, with their own military academies and research institutions, with their 
own logistics and acquisition structures. And all of them require resources and means, dispers-
ing and depreciating financial resources allotted for defence.15 
Sounds very familiar, does it not? The situations in both countries have exactly the same 
roots. 
It is impossible and unwise to reform just the Armed Forces without the redistribution of mis-
sions and tasks and without optimising the whole state military organisation. Given the re-
source deficit, Ukraine is doomed to apply (at least once) the so called 'top-down' approach if 
it wants to create a stable, reasonable system that could function within the established 
resource limits. Some statements of the top-level MOD officials sound rather promising in 
this sense: 
The main thing is that reform of the Armed Forces is a component of the overall military re-
form, and it cannot be carried out separately. During the five years of Ukraine's independence 
the Armed Forces have been reformed, but military reform in the state has not been 
conducted.16 
                                                 
13 Since September 1996, the new Ukrainian currency hryvnya. 
14 V. Mukhyn, 'The Armed Forces Do Not Only Consume, They Can Produce as Well,' HOLOS UKRAYINY 
in Ukrainian, 12 November 1996, p. 6. 
15 O. Falynev, 'Reforms in Armed Forces Have No Alternative,' KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian, 6 Septem-
ber 1996, p. 1. 
16 Lieutenant General O. Kuzmuk, 'Currently No One in the World May Say That Aggression Against His 
Country is Not Possible,' KYYIVSKA PRAVDA in Ukrainian, 31 October 1996, p. 1. 
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Unfortunately, real steps give ground for quite a different conclusion: there is no clear under-
standing on the part of the Ukrainian government that the country needs not just the reform of 
the Armed Forces, but the State military reform on the whole.17 
There is one more important aspect of this issue. Most foreign authors who write on civil-mil-
itary relations and military reform in Ukraine underestimate the importance of the aforesaid 
dimensional aspect. To reflect the existence of numerous military establishments next to the 
Armed Forces, in the case of Ukraine one ought to redefine even the vocabulary. At least such 
notions as military budget, military planning, military establishment, civil-military relations, 
and military expenditures must take into account all the aforementioned armed structures. In 
the case of Ukraine there is a real difference between these terms and those normally used by 
foreign experts: 'synonymous' notions, such as: military (defence) budget, military (defence) 
planning, military (defence) establishment, military (defence) expenditures, and so forth. If 
one wants to get into the substance and indeed into the origins of current Ukrainian problems 
of civil-military relations, he must apply a much wider approach to the military sphere. 
1.3 System's Element: MOD as the Youngest Stepchild  
One of the biggest challenges facing the Ukrainian military is the immaturity of the Armed 
Forces and the Defence Ministry as state institutions in comparison with other armed 
structures whose existence originate in the Soviet epoch. 
In every country, the war office holds a leading place in the hierarchy of power ministries. 
Things are somewhat different in Ukraine. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Security 
Service of Ukraine existed under different names and grew along with other structures. Natu-
rally, over these past few years, their authority grew and they have become part of the state 
mechanism. Whereas the Ministry of Defence is a structure that did not exist at the level of 
republic: during the Soviet period, Ukraine, by law, did not have its own Armed Forces. They 
have been in existence only since 1992 and now they are experiencing the greatest 
difficulties. 
Everyone – from an ordinary functionary to the Cabinet of Ministers – understands that the 
Ministry of Defence is still child requiring nurturing and help. Nevertheless, 'rival' 
organisations to the Armed Forces are being strengthened, notably the Interior forces, the 
Security Service, the National Guard and the Border troops. The National Guard, for instance, 
has been booming because of a stake of the highest leadership in it. Since 1991, the Border 
Troops have become a sort of symbol of sovereignty that faces threats and challenges 
(although usually of a non-military nature) on a daily basis. Given the difficulties and 
instability of the transition period, the Security Service and the Interior Troops have always 
something (or somebody) to fight against, whereas the Armed Forces face no real enemy right 
now. In fact, an interesting viewpoint was presented by Dmytriy Vydrin, Director of 
International Institute of Global and Regional Security: 
                                                 
17 Related issues were discussed on 13 October 1996 in Kiev during the seminar conducted by the Centre for 
European Security Studies. The material was presented in a report: O. Vachayev, 'Do Not Disregard Some-
body Else's Experience,' NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian, 15 October 1996, p. 2. 
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Today, unfortunately, Ukraine has no enemies or friends. Why do I say 'unfortunately?' Be-
cause enemies and friends emerge in the presence of clearly defined national interests, which 
either coincide or conflict with someone else's interests. A vague policy in the ordering of pri-
orities and the pursuit of national interests, unfortunately, precludes the emergence of strong 
friends and of powerful adversaries.18 
One should not look for enemies or (let alone) create them in order to attract the leadership's 
attention to the problems of the Armed Forces. It is also quite obvious, that the leadership 
needs to define for what purpose it maintains the Army, in both terms of missions and tasks. 
The definition should be less vague, less politicised and its wording must contain something 
meaningful for military planners. The dimensional aspect seems to be very important for 
Ukraine not only today, but also in the near future. One can easily foresee artificial obstacles 
on the way to a reasonable balancing of existing power structures, of redistribution of 
missions, tasks and finances accordingly. Those obstacles are political, corporate and 
personal in nature. On the other hand, the current situation cannot last forever. One would 
support Volodymyr Shevchenko, member of the Parliamentary Defence Committee, who 
said: "The Army cannot be an arena of endless restructuring, as is presently the case."19 
Sooner or later, Ukraine must start a full-dimensional military reform, not only imitation of 
reforms in the Armed Forces alone. Hopefully, it will happen sooner rather than later. 
Chapter 2: The Failure to Address the Problem 
2.1 Programme of Reforms: Vehicle for the System 
'Plans remain meaningless piles of paper unless requirements and resources match.' 
(John M. Collins) 
The programme for the Armed Forces build-up and development has become the focus of civ-
il-military relations in Ukraine. Development of the programme is envisaged by Article 8 of 
the Law 'On Defence of Ukraine.'20 The Defence Ministry is responsible for its drafting. Since 
1992 there have been four attempts to develop and get the programme approved. Each of four 
Defence Ministers has tried. Despite the assertions of the current Chief of the General Staff, 
experts believe, even today that there is no 'light at the end of tunnel' yet. 
The nature and extent of the transformation that must be carried out in the military sphere 
made it possible to discuss not only reform in the Army as such, but rather the full-scale 
build-up of an absolutely new Armed Forces. Unfortunately, there was not enough discussion 
at the appropriate level required to ensure the success of such a huge task. Generally 
speaking: 
                                                 
18 D. Vydrin, 'Today Ukraine Has No Particular Friends Or Particular Enemies, and That Is Not Good,' 
NEZAVISIMOST in Russian, 12 July 1995, p. 7. 
19 Lieutenant Colonel V. Shevchenko, 'The Army Adapts to the Needs of Defence,' HOLOS UKRAYINY in 
Ukrainian, 5 March 1996, p. 8. 
20 Law of Ukraine 'On Defence of Ukraine,' Collected documents 'Military Legislation in Ukraine and Law' in 
Ukrainian, VARTA Press (Kiev 1994) p. 28. 
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the concept of reform (in contrast to other kinds of social change, revolution, coup, or piece-
meal social tinkering, for example) connotes a change for the better by means of a deliberate, 
orderly, gradual and systematic process which presupposes the existence of stable, cohesive 
and integrated structures.21 
The Ukrainian Armed Forces 'plainly fail to present a coherent, unified whole and also lack 
the stability and cohesion which would enable them to be considered as a candidate for 
wholesale reform.'22 Thus, instead of reforming one ought to talk about the building up and 
development of the Armed Forces in Ukraine. 
The problem of building up the Armed Forces has remained topical for Ukraine over the 
entire period of its independent development. All researchers, by and large, emphasise two 
reasons for the slowdown in the progress of military organisational development in Ukraine: 
first, lack of a clear-cut and scientifically substantiated conceptual framework and, second, 
inadequate financing (directly for the reforming) of the Armed Forces. Obviously, there is 
one more reason lack of vision on both military and civilian sides and therefore lack of the 
necessary guidance through the most important stages of the defence planning process. Given 
the lack of clear (if any) guidance, it is rather unfair to criticise too harshly the General Staff's 
inability to reform the Armed Forces. It is also true, however, that the General Staff has been 
unable to provide the necessary inspiration and leadership. 
This study addresses some of the specific features of military development that have taken 
shape in Ukraine, and that have both domestic and foreign aspects. This chapter offers the 
reader to return to the recent history, touch upon the programme's substance, the key players 
and the leadership involved, and upon the procedures and legislative framework, emerging 
from this rather chaotic process. 
2.1.1 Contradictory Wording at the Top Level 
As early as July 1994 President Kravchuk was quite certain: "We have a programme for 
building the Armed Forces till the year 2010."23 By contrast, in November of the same year, 
the optimism of the leadership appears to have faded away. The newly elected President 
Kuchma admitted: "so far Ukraine had no clear Military Doctrine and comprehensive 
programme for the development of the Armed Forces. We should review the whole strategy 
with regard to the Army."24 
In April 1996, after a year and a half in office, President Kuchma grew more optimistic: 
A state programme has practically been drawn up to build and develop Ukraine's Armed 
Forces. The main aim of the military reform is to create a battle-worthy Army, capable of ful-
                                                 
21 T. Waters, Military Reform or Military Disintegration in the Commonwealth, Conference proceedings, RAF 
Staff College, Bracknell, 23-24 April 1992, p. 2. 
22 Ibid. p. 3. 
23 Ukraine: President Kravchuk Pledges Further Social Guarantees to Kiev Troops, Kiev Radio Ukraine World 
Service in Ukrainian, 1500 GMT, 7 July 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-131. 
24 President Kuchma Notes Need for Strong Military, Moscow ITAR-TASS in English, 1454 GMT, 14 No-
vember 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-220. 
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filling the tasks of defending the country and not being an excessive burden to it. Taking this 
into account, the structure is to be optimised, the strength of the Armed Forces worked out, and 
measures taken to strengthen civilian control and military personnel policies in the Army and 
other military formations in Ukraine.25 
It is arguable whether one could speak about the existence of 'a practically' developed pro-
gramme, if the structure is yet to be optimised, if the strength is yet to be worked out and the 
measures are yet to be taken; and all this must be applied not only to the Armed Forces, but to 
the other military formations of Ukraine as well. In December 1996 President Kuchma 
became visibly nervous. Evaluating the MOD-led process of the programme development, he 
said: "It is not a work. It is the worst version of its imitation ... Today we can only speak in 
future tense about the state programme for build-up and development of the Armed Forces."26 
Following their superiors (the Presidents), month after month, year after year the Defence 
Ministers, in their turn, proclaimed conflicting objectives in terms of military personnel 
ceilings, force structure, not to mention lack of clear vision and understanding of the reform's 
substance on the whole. Let us compare only two quotations of Defence Minister Valeriy 
Shmarov: 
The numerical strength should gradually be brought to the level determined by our Doctrine 
and the Concept of Defence and Build-up of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.27 
By the end of 1995 we are planning to have a 400,000 - strong Army. This figure has been 
found to be economically feasible.28 
It is necessary to give several brief comments on these statements. Firstly, Ukrainian Military 
Doctrine does not specify the level up to which 'the numerical strength should be gradually 
brought.' Secondly, the aforementioned Concept of Defence and Build-up of the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces does specify the level. According to the document, personnel ceiling must be 
established on the level of 0.8-0.9% of the Ukrainian population, that means 400,000-420,000 
people. The 'only' contradiction is, that this 0.8-0.9% ceiling was established not only for the 
Armed Forces, but also for the Border Troops, the National Guard and the Civil Defence for-
mations on the whole. Thirdly, the second statement of the Minister leaves no doubt that (in 
contradiction with the letter of the Concept) he envisages 400,000 militaries just for the 
Armed Forces under his authority. Finally, nobody will ever find out who was such a smart 
                                                 
25 Ukraine: President Kuchma Delivers Annual Address to the Parliament, Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service 
in Ukrainian, 1815 GMT, 2 April 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-067. 
26 L. Kuchma, 'Ukraine Does Not Need Funny Armed Forces, It Needs of Full Value Army' URYADOVYY 
KURYER in Ukrainian, 17 December 1996, p. 3. 
27 Report on Defence Minister's News Conference, Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian, 1915 
GMT 26 August 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-167. 
28 Interview with Defence Minister Valeriy Shmarov: What Does Valeriy Shmarov, Ukrainian Deputy Prime 
Minister and Defence Minister, Think About Most Often. – Kharkiv VREMYA in Russian, 29 June 1995, p. 
2, FBIS-SOV-95-139. 
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expert in economics (in the MOD or somewhere else) to justify for Minister Shmarov that 
"400,000 ... figure has been found to be economically feasible."29 
2.1.2 Unsuccessful Attempts at the Middle Level 
"If you don't know what to do, you can't plan how to do it." (John M. Collins) 
There were several attempts made to form a programme for the build-up and development of 
the Armed Forces, though these were unsuccessful. In 1992-1993 mainly urgent and rather 
obvious measures were undertaken to reshape and restructure the former Soviet military 
grouping.30 On the whole, there was no regular work carried out on the programme, although 
there were numerous poorly co-ordinated attempts to create it in parts (research, education 
and training, acquisition, logistics, and other spheres of military activities). 
In order to promote the 'second breathing' and better co-ordination of the process, President 
Kuchma undertook some concrete steps. On 2 December 1994, during the MOD Board meet-
ing, he authorised the preparation of two state programmes envisaged by the Law 'On 
Defence of Ukraine:' the State programme for the build-up and development of the Armed 
Forces, and the State programme for the development of armaments and military equipment. 
On 2 February 1995, the National Security Council under the President of Ukraine, approved 
the resolution 'On Strategic Decision for Employment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 
Accordance with Current Military-political Situation and Economic Capabilities of the 
State.'31 The President also authorised the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministry of Defence to 
develop and submit for his approval the drafts of the aforementioned state programmes. 
Already in 1994, the authority to co-ordinate the work was given to the newly established 
(General Staff) Directorate for the Build-up and Development of the Armed Forces, headed 
by Major General Dmitro Umanets. Moreover, in 1995, when relations between the Defence 
Minister and the Chief of the General Staff deteriorated, the Directorate was re-subordinated 
directly to Minister Shmarov. Unfortunately, the Directorate had not produced any sound 
result. 
A year later, the state leaders became eye-witnesses to the fact that nothing had been achieved 
by the Ministry of Defence. Only the contradictions between Minister Shmarov and his Chief 
of the General Staff Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata (regarding the main directions for re-
forming the Armed Forces) had become much stronger. 
                                                 
29 Some foreign experts and observers try to draw certain conclusions and single trends and tendencies out of 
this kind of statement. 
30 The military leaders have re-arranged the existing three Military Districts, leaving only two of them (Odessa 
and Carpathian) and creating the MOD and the Armed Forces' Main Staff Headquarters on the base of Kiev 
Military District Headquarters. Other obvious steps were also made: first, structures that were supposed to 
support other Soviet military groupings were liquidated; second, operational formations (the Field Armies) 
were transformed into operational-tactical formations (the Army corps). 
31 Ukrainian Armed Forces: Current State and Problems of Reforming, Report of Ukrainian Centre for Eco-
nomic and Political Research in Ukrainian (Kiev 1996), p. 8. 
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For the second attempt the MOD had drafted the 'State Program for the Build-up and Devel-
opment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 1995-2010.' The ultimate aim of the programme – 
as it was declared by General Umanets – was a new model of the Armed Forces. It was envis-
aged that they were to be numerically small, well armed and supplied with regard for the de-
fence needs and economic capabilities of the state. However, the wording was not convincing. 
Closer study of the draft showed that it was a simply unbalanced 'list of wishes with no 
serious substantiation attached to it. Evaluating the draft, Lieutenant General Ihnatenko, MP 
and former Head of the MOD Main Personnel Directorate expressed his doubts: 
The Ukrainian Army requires not casual and partial reforms, but rather full, consistent and sys-
tematic remaking. This process is difficult, and does not tolerate excessive haste. The first 
bricks in this structure should at the same time be laid solidly and without error.32 
The General believed that the military can achieve such the objective only with the aid of the 
Government and the Parliament. In his view, "only independent representatives of people, 
supported by public opinion of the entire country, can help to clear away the obstacles on the 
way to the creation of Ukrainian Armed Forces."33 
On 28 November 1995, an expanded meeting of the MOD Board was held with the participa-
tion of President Leonid Kuchma, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; 
Chairman of the Parliament Oleksandr Moroz; and Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk. Heads 
of ministries and department, directly associated with the defence sphere also took part in the 
meeting. The meeting outlined the trends of the further development and reforms in the 
Army. 
In his report, Defence Minister Valeriy Shmarov analysed the course of military building, its 
positive aspects and the shortcomings. The head of the MOD specified some urgent tasks, up-
on the fulfilment of which, combat readiness of the Armed Forces and the prospects of their 
development depended. President Kuchma stressed that building of the Armed Forces is one 
of the main factors in the state building. He also underscored that "it is only in case of proper 
attention to the Army on the part of all state institutions that we will be able to change the 
situation for the better and create up-to-date Armed Forces."34 He authorised the Cabinet of 
Ministers to take under its control the fulfilment of the President's directives on the building 
of the Armed Forces. 
The President was forced to ascertain that his tasks were not fulfilled. Moreover, he evaluated 
the state of reform in the Defence Ministry as absolutely unsatisfactory and instructed the 
Ministry to develop a plan of urgent measures. 
                                                 
32 Lieutenant General O. Ihnatenko, 'What the Army of Ukraine Will Be: The Necessity of Military Reform,' 
Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian, 10 August 1995, p. 2. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Kuchma, Moroz, Marchuk, Shmarov Discuss Army Issues: The State Needs Up-to-date Armed Forces, Kiev 
URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian, 30 November 1995, p. 1. 
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2.1.3 'Detective' Stories 
Further development (in drafting the programme) was progressing almost according to a sce-
nario of a classical detective story. It was under a veil of secrecy, even the military leadership 
at the very top was unaware of the process, let alone providing input or co-ordination. Instead 
of General Umanets and his Directorate, a new team of about five General Staff officers with 
Major General Mykola Palchuk (then Chief of Staff of Main Army Directorate of the General 
Staff) took responsibility for the process. Unfortunately, they were also working mainly on 
their own, without clear guidance from the MOD leadership, not to mention lack of any 
meaningful input from other state structures. 
On 6 January 1996, Presidium of the National Security Council, under the President, 
approved the draft submitted by Minister Shmarov. The approval was rather conditional: they 
approved the Concept, i.e. the main directions of defence reform. In compliance with the 
Concept, the MOD had to form an appropriate programme. On 25 January 1996, the MOD 
Board considered the draft in turn of the 'state' programme for the build-up and development 
of the Armed Forces, which was actually prepared in the Ministry itself again without any 
involvement of the other state institutions. The story got quite an interesting turn on 3 
February 1996 at the conference, addressing the problems the Ukrainian Armed Forces faced 
with regard to its build-up: 
A staff has been established – with (Defence Minister) Valeriy Shmarov's consent – in the 
MOD and its operations are practically illegal. Hiding in Pushcha Vodytsa (suburbs of Kiev), 
its officers have drafted a programme for profound Army reform, keeping it secret even from 
the Chief of the General Staff.35 
This is what Major General Leonid Kravchuk,36 First Deputy Commandant of the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces Academy, reported. Leonid Kravchuk claimed that General Lopata, Chief of 
the General Staff, 'declassified' this information when he delivered a report to the Academy 
instructors on 2 February 1996. According to General Kravchuk: 
the 'secret' plan envisages the abolishment of the two remaining Military Districts. This meas-
ure can also be interpreted as the first step toward the ruining of the state defence system which 
was created with such great effort over the past four years. Defence Ministry Main Depart-
ments' chiefs were given a short deadline to look through the draft prepared by a secret staff 
and then ordered to sign it. A refusal to sign the document could lead to most serious sanctions. 
Regrettably, there were quite a number of generals who were ready to sign any document to 
preserve their privileges and benefits.37 
In the presence of Ukrainian MPs and Defence Ministry representatives, General Kravchuk 
said that he considered the establishment of an illegal structure within the power ministry as 
                                                 
35 Report from the conference by Klyuchikov, Hennadiy: Major General Leonid Kravchuk Revealed a 'Clan-
destine' Staff Within the Defence Ministry, Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian, 6 February 1996, 
p. 1. 
36 Do not get confused: he is [only] a namesake of the former Ukrainian President. 
37 Report from the conference by H. Klyuchikov, Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian, 6 February 
1996, p. 3. 
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an attempt by a military coup to fully destroy the state defence system and then abolish the 
sovereignty of the state. He called upon the entire officer corps to force the Defence Ministry 
Board, by all means available, to resign because of an attempt to undermine the defence 
potential of the state; because of the unsatisfactory combat readiness of the Army and the 
inability to concert efforts around the priority defence tasks. 
In his turn, Colonel General Ivan Bizhan, First Deputy Defence Minister was not inclined to 
overdramatise the situation in the MOD. He confirmed that on 26 November 1995, he was in-
structed (by order of Minister Shmarov) to set up and head a Working Group that would draft 
proposals for the Armed Forces' build-up programme. All Main Departments' chiefs were in-
volved to some extent in preparing the programme draft. According to General Bizhan, the 
programme draft had been discussed at the Defence Ministry Board and at the meeting of the 
Defence Council.38 
It was the immediate changes in the Armed Forces that became the primary issue at that con-
ference. According to the plans of its organisers, the forum had to become the first open and 
decisive attack by the generals and officers who did not approve the officially pursued course 
of the military reform. Therefore, a massive support group of Ukrainian MPs was brought in 
to participate in the conference. The top-level of the Defence Ministry was invited to play the 
role of 'whipping boys,' but they did not accept this challenge. 
Ten days later, Minister Shmarov explained that "a programme for reforming the Armed 
Forces which had been drafted until the year 2010 will become valid soon. The programme 
had already been discussed by the Government, the President, and the National Security 
Council. At the moment the programme is being redrafted and supplemented."39 One week 
later, Colonel Oleksandr Kluban, press secretary to Minister Shmarov, clarified some plans 
on reforming the Armed Forces. According to him, there was practically nothing done to 
reform the Armed Forces for the last four years. Therefore, the Defence Ministry Board has 
developed a Concept for the reform of the Ukrainian Army. It envisages: 
first of all, changes in the management of the Armed Forces. The objective will be reached by 
means of the establishment of seven Operational-territorial Commands – instead of two Mili-
tary Districts – based on seven Army corps.40 
Some experts expressed their concern that the creation of Operational-territorial Commands 
(with their autonomous logistics systems) could generate the federalisation of the Armed 
Forces and would lead to the establishment of several regional armies. However, the authors 
of that programme, General Bizhan among others, ruled this out. Colonel Kluban said, that 
not only Defence Minister Valeriy Shmarov, but also the National Security Council had 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 I. Kovtonyuk, 'Due to the 'Conditional' Training of Ukrainian Troops, It Is Difficult To Form Even a Tank 
Battalion of Peacekeepers,' Kiev UKRAYINA MOLODA in Ukrainian, 16 February 1996, p. 3. 
40 Report from the news conference by Y. Borutskiy, Lviv VYSOKYY ZAMOK in Ukrainian, 22 February 
1996, FBIS-SOV-96-042. 
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already supported this proposal.41 Two days later there was another interesting 
announcement: 
Negative estimation of the military reform state was confirmed by Deputy Defence Minister 
Ivan Bizhan at a regular briefing in the MOD. He declared that the Ministry of Defence has 
made mistakes in taking principal decisions concerning the creation and re-stationing of some 
units, and developing the programme of the military education reform.42 
It is understandable, that all the 'mistakes' General Bizhan was talking about received the 
blessing of the Defence Minister as the Head of the MOD. It is also obvious, that the 
'Ministry of Defence' is quite a big institution, within which there is always 'somebody' who 
prepares (proposes) decisions for the Minister's final approval. Let us become acquainted with 
a chronological account that will help to clarify the origins of the 'mistakes' only in the field 
'of military education reform.' 
• In 1992 the Minister of Defence (Kostyantyn Morozov) signed Directive No. 133. Accord-
ing to Directive No. 133, all military educational institutions (more than 100,000 militaries 
and almost 100,000 civilians) were re-subordinated from the military services to the MOD 
Main Military Education Directorate. 
• In 1994 the Minister of Defence (Vitaliy Radetskyy) signed Directive No. 164. According 
to Directive No. 164, the military educational institutions were re-subordinated back to the 
military services. 
• In 1996 the Minister of Defence (Valeriy Shmarov) signed Directive No. 98. According to 
Directive No. 98, the military educational institutions were re-subordinated once again 
from the military services to the MOD Main Military Education Directorate. 
• In 1997 the Minister of Defence (Olexandr Kuzmuk) signed Directive No. 47. According 
to Directive No. 47, the military educational institutions were re-subordinated once more 
to the military services. 
All the aforementioned directives "introducing both centralised and decentralised systems 
are" (of course) – aimed at optimising the structure, improving the management, reducing the 
overhead costs and so forth. 
It is not difficult to take notice of the regularity: the Ministers (No. 1) Morozov and (No. 3) 
Shmarov, saw the optimum in a centralised system, and the Ministers (No. 2) Radetskyy and 
(No. 4) Kuzmuk preferred a decentralised one. There is only one invisible continuity in this 
conflicting zigzag process. This is Colonel General Ivan Bizhan, First Deputy Defence Minis-
ter, who, since 1992, has been the highest ranking MOD official, responsible for military edu-
cation under all of the aforementioned Defence Ministers. It was under his co-ordination that 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Problems of the Armed Forces and the Military-Industrial Complex of Ukraine and Civilian Control over 
Their Activities, Report of Ukrainian Centre for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies (Kiev 
1996), p. 3. The same idea (expressed by General Bizhan) is to be found in Lieutenant Colonel S. Chornous, 
'The Reforms Are Dictated by Life,' Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian, 24 February 1996, p. 1. 
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all four directives were drafted. Is it not interesting that it is General Bizhan himself who "de-
clared that the Ministry of Defence has made mistakes in taking principal decisions concern-
ing the creation and re-stationing of some units and developing the programme of military 
education reform?" How can one disagree with John Collins who said: "No (defence 
planning) system is any better than people who shape and operate it."43 
2.1.4 Sometimes New Is Rather Forgotten Old, and Is Not Necessarily Better 
In February 1996, President Kuchma relieved Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata, Chief of 
Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from his post. The decision caused a great fuss among 
Ukrainian politicians. As the second most important personality in the MOD, General Lopata 
had traditionally been considered a bulwark of the Ukraine's military-industrial complex and 
an advocate of the (Soviet model) Military Districts system. According to the official 
wording, the Chief of the General Staff was fired, because he exceeded his authority by 
putting to public judgement something that is a state secret;44 in military vocabulary labelled 
as 'insubordination.' 
The debate about the dismissal of General Lopata hit the news headlines for a while. On the 
one hand, there were five high ranking General Staff officers who, reportedly,45 submitted 
their resignation to express support for their former chief. On the other hand, certain reports 
announced that all of Lopata's supporters would be dismissed, because they refused to sign 
the programme draft prepared by the aforesaid 'secret staff.' Colonel Oleksandr Kluban, the 
press secretary of Minister Shmarov, assured that: 
Lieutenant General Hennadyy Huryn, Lieutenant General Heorhyy Pankratov, and Major Gen-
eral Anatoliy Yarovyy remain in their posts. As regards Lieutenant General Anatoliy Korky-
shko and Colonel Petro Korotchenko, who are in pension age and have not changed their way 
of thinking, they have been retired.46 
Despite the assertion, all three aforementioned generals were very soon released from their 
duties. 
In February 1996 President Kuchma appointed new Chief of the General Staff – Lieutenant 
General Oleksandr Zatynayko, one of the Army corps commanders. Interestingly enough, it 
was General Zatynayko who became responsible for the implementation of the programme, 
while it was originally designed by ... General Bizhan. However, when asked to give his opin-
ion on the document in March 1996 (when Minister Shmarov was still in charge), General 
Zatynayko replied: 
                                                 
43 J.M. Collins, U.S. Defence Planning (Westview Press, Boulder 1982), p. 9. 
44 This 'something' was his different approach to the building of the Armed Forces. In general, it had nothing to 
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military officer to put 'to public judgment' his disagreement with his civilian superior. 
45 Ukraine: Top Brass Reportedly Resign Over General Lopata Dismissal, Moscow NTV in Russian, 1900 
GMT 17 February 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-034. 
46 Report from the news conference by Y. Borutskiy, Lviv VYSOKYY ZAMOK in Ukrainian, 22 February 
1996, p. 1, FBIS-SOV-96-042. 
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Undoubtedly this programme is ... correct with regard to its contents. As for Military Districts, 
in my opinion, they are relics of the Soviet Army; they were created with an eye toward broad-
scale military operations.47 
He then supported the idea of seven (later reduced to five) Operational-territorial Commands 
envisaged by the Bizhan-Shmarov plan. Starting from July 1996, when Lieutenant General 
Olexandr Kuzmuk took over the MOD, both General Bizhan and General Zatynayko have be-
come in favour of ... only three ... Military Districts and the only difference is that this time 
the Districts have been actually renamed into Operational Commands. Therefore, the process 
made a full circle and the military leadership has ended with the same structure, Colonel Gen-
eral (already retired) Lopata was the strongest proponent of.48 
It seems, that in Ukraine like in the Russian Federation, quoting one of the Russian generals, 
deception has become an integral element of reform because it sort of compensates for its ab-
sence... Reform is increasingly covered with the dirt of immorality... Sometimes we get the im-
pression that not staid generals are involved but children who do not know what they should do 
with a complex electronic toy.49 
To avoid difficulties with mass media and MPs, the programme draft is (intentionally) kept 
classified, although it is obvious that most of the material contains no secrets. Moreover, it 
should be open to debate in order to gain public support and funding. As Vitaliy Karpenko, 
editor-in-chief of VECHIRNIY KYYIV, wrote with vexation, "having power, it is much 
easier to remove opponents than to discuss the issues with them on an equal basis, especially 
if there is no reasonable argument for such a discussion."50 
The Defence Ministry has declined to participate in an open debate on the programme sub-
stance and on military reform in general. If the leadership had been more receptive to experts' 
suggestions, many mistakes and questionable decisions would easily have been avoided.51 
                                                 
47 O. Zatynayko, 'Ukraine's Defence Capabilities Will Not Deteriorate If Military Districts Are Disbanded,' 
Kiev UKRAYINA MOLODA in Ukrainian, 22 March 1996, p. 1. 
48 In fact, even in October 1996 (according to General Hudym) the destiny of Military Districts still remained 
undecided. For more details see: Land Forces To Be Reorganised, Reduced, Moscow INTERFAX in Eng-
lish, 1420 GMT 15 October 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-201. 
49 Ch. Dick, A Bear Without Claws: The Russian Army in the Nineties, Centre for Conflict Studies of The 
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Camberley (Surrey 1996). 
50 V. Karpenko, 'Bustle in the Defence Ministry,' Kiev VECHIRNIY KYYIV in Ukrainian, 20 February 1996, 
p. 1. 
51 Firstly, so far only the general structure of the Armed Forces was considered as an example. If one touches 
upon other aspects of military reform (research, acquisition, unification of military services, MOD structure, 
personnel policy, etc.) a few more 'interesting' stories would be revealed to the reader. Some military leaders 
would never allow an open debate with the media. Neither do they wish to get involved in well-informed 
Parliamentary discussion or a testimony. Secondly, few non-governmental research institutions did try to 
open such a debate in 1996. For instance, a press conference was organised to discuss the report 'Ukrainian 
Armed Forces: Current State and Problems of Reforming' prepared by experts from the Ukrainian Centre for 
Economic and Political Research. It is worth mentioning that some of the recommendations were accepted 
by the state leadership, for example, this one: "Any further attempts to develop the programme based on the 
(already traditional) narrowly departmental approach will produce no successful result. The first step should 
be the creation of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Military Reform under the President of Ukraine." 
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2.1.5 Interdepartmental Co-ordination: Contour of the Procedure 
On 2 April 1996, in his Annual report to the Parliament, President Kuchma made a statement 
on "the practical completion of the development" of the programme and gave an assignment 
to conduct its economic substantiation.52 Unfortunately, the happy ending was not yet in 
sight. It was found in a month, that the main goal – the forming of the State programme for 
build-up and development of the Armed Forces – had not been achieved, i.e. the national 
Army model had not been created yet. On 5 May 1996, President Kuchma signed the Decree 
'On Creation of the State Expert Committee for Build-up and Development of the Armed 
Forces of Ukraine and Other Armed Structures' that was an additional confirmation of this 
fact. Volodymyr Horbulin, Secretary of the National Security Council,53 was empowered to 
head the Committee. According to its mission, the Committee must address, review and lead 
the development and further implementation of the programme on the basis of the Concept, 
approved earlier (6 January 1996). The Committee consists of different experts to review the 
MOD programme draft. To complete the programme and to co-ordinate this process with the 
other military structures and state institutions, they recommended the establishment of the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Military Reform under the leadership of the President. The 
implementation of the decision was postponed due to the 'fighting' around the draft 
Constitution (adopted on 28 June 1996) and replacement of the Defence Minister (July 
1996).54 
According to Volodymyr Horbulin, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, 
the fact that Lieutenant General Oleksandr Kuzmuk was appointed (as a Defence Minister) 
replacing civilian Minister Valeriy Shmarov, Ukraine "has not rejected the idea of civilian 
control."55 Conducting one of his first news conferences, Minister Kuzmuk noticed his 
understanding of the issue: "The main objective ... is to get civilian leaders to know our 
problems and resolve them jointly with the military. It is our common cause – we work for 
the state and for the people."56 
In July 1996 another step was made, when the Interdepartmental Committee was finally 
established. The new Defence Minister, Lieutenant General Kuzmuk – who had spent only a 
few days in the Cabinet of Ministers – and had not even had an opportunity to look around – 
was to head the Committee. This was the first mistake. The Committee, with such an 
important and complex objective, should have been headed by the Supreme Commander-in-
                                                 
52 Ukraine: President Kuchma Delivers Annual Address to the Parliament, Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service 
in Ukrainian, 1815 GMT 2 April 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-067. 
53 According to the Constitution of Ukraine, since 28 June 1996 – National Security and Defence Council 
(NSDC) of Ukraine. 
54 Time is a wise doctor: new Defence Minister has new vision of the Armed Forces. As a result, the new pro-
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55 What Will Volodymyr Horbulin Discuss With the CIA Director? Kiev VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI 
in Russian, 17 September 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-185. 
56 Interview with Ukraine's new Defence Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk : The Minister Hits the Bull's Eye, Lviv 
ZA VILNU UKRAYINU in Ukrainian, 23 July 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-148. 
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Chief himself. The Prime Minister and the Secretary of the National Security and Defence 
Council, i.e. the officials with real power at the interdepartmental level, would have been the 
only alternative. 
On 31 August 1996, putting the President's Decree into practice, (although with a delay) De-
fence Minister Kuzmuk signed his Directive. It envisaged the establishment of the MOD 
Working Group with aiming to complete the State programme for the Armed Forces build-up 
and development till year 2005 and to present the final draft for the MOD Board for consid-
eration by 25 October. Members of the Working Group were rather 'notional' – 27 high rank-
ing (MOD and General Staff) officials – with Major General Valeriy Fomyn, First Deputy 
Chief of the General Staff, as Chairman. This was the second mistake. Firstly, General Fomyn 
had spent only couple months in the General Staff and, secondly, he had not been released 
from his other duties in order to focus on the programme. Needless to say, it was rather diffi-
cult for the Major General to be in charge of more than 20 Major Generals, a few Lieutenant 
Generals, and even some Colonel Generals in the Working Group. 
In fact, it was Major General Mykola Palchuk, Chief of Operations who was supposed to co-
ordinate all the activities, as well as ... continuing to carry out his exigent daily duties.57 In re-
ality, a couple of senior officers from the General Staff Main Operations Directorate were 
working on a daily basis 'on behalf of both the MOD Working Group and the Interdepartmen-
tal Committee (with the 'notional' membership as well). 
In March 1996, General Radetskyy, the MOD Inspector General (and former Defence Minis-
ter) warned: "There is nothing more dangerous today for our society than degrading the sci-
ence-intensive process of the Armed Forces' reformation to the level of a commonplace de-
partmental matter."58 
His and other experts' voices had not been heard by either state, or MOD leadership, although 
it is so obvious that the military sphere should not be left in the hands of mere militaries. One 
way or another, it affects and is influenced by many other factors, such as political, economic, 
diplomatic, ecological, social, societal, etc. Therefore, many governmental and non-govern-
mental institutions must be involved in the process of military reform. 
Three more events appear to be important in understanding the procedure to review and ap-
prove the programme. Firstly, on 6 December 1996, the State Expert Commission gave the 
'green light' for the programme draft. Secondly, on 13 December 1996, during the MOD 
Board meeting, the President ... sharply condemned the military leadership guilty of "the 
                                                 
57 General Palchuk was one of the authors of the previous draft. Having tried to justify the necessity of origi-
nally seven (and later five) Operational-territorial Commands for about a year, now he 'suddenly' becomes in 
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58 General of the Army of Ukraine V. Radetskyy, 'Problems of Building the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the 
Context of the National Security of the State,' Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian, 26 March 1996, p. 
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worst version of the imitation of work" on the programme draft. In his view, advancement on 
the reforms strongly depends on how objectively and seriously – "without hysterics and 
superfluous emotions"59 – one estimates the current situation and what conclusions one 
draws. This is the President's sharp, but objective estimation: 
In reality, there is a lot of noise at the very top, but concrete and visible results are rarely seen 
even through the stereoscopic telescope. It is not a work. It is the worst version of its imitation. 
Therefore, today we can only speak in future tense about the State programme for build-up and 
development of the Armed Forces. It cannot proceed this way any further. The time for persua-
sion, discussion and meditation is over. It is time to be personally responsible for the state of 
affairs.60 
Thirdly, on 28 December 1996, the National Security and Defence Council headed by the 
President ... approved the programme. After the harsh criticism of 13 December, this sudden 
approval seemed rather strange, since everybody understands that two weeks are not enough 
to finish what has not been finished for years.61 Obviously, that decision was a result of the 
internal political pressure on the administration and a will to show some positive results of the 
new Defence Minister's activity. 
However, it is clear that the approved programme will not allow effective reform of the 
Armed Forces and can even lead to a deterioration of the current situation; mainly, because it 
is not based on reliable economic, political, and organisational provisions. Interestingly 
enough, the Defence Minister does not see any need to seek Parliament's approval of the 
programme.62 Thus, one can witness more disagreement between the executive and the 
legislative branches on the issue when it comes to financing the military reform (if indeed it is 
envisaged at all by the authors of the programme).63 
2.1.6 Other Civilian Players: Degree of Involvement 
It has become obvious that the building of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as a component of 
nation-building, cannot only be a military matter, but should be resolved at the state level. In 
                                                 
59 L. Kuchma, 'Ukraine Does Not Need Funny Armed Forces, It Needs of Full Value Army,' Kiev 
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reformation. Moreover, they expect that only during the first year of its implementation, the Armed Forces 
will save almost as much as two current defence budgets. Thus, the Army will make money instead of 
spending it. Sounds good, does it not? Any Parliament would be willing to approve such a 'profitable' plan. 
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its turn, at the state level, civilian leadership must have the required level of expertise, to 
undertake this task. As Gavin Kennedy puts it: 
To know something about the efficiency of the defence functions we have to know more than 
the mere aggregate of all personnel costs, all equipment costs and all other costs ... If we know 
the expenditures that are supposed to be allocated to specific functions, we can at least ask ele-
mentary questions: is this defence function worth the cost; is there a better use (defence or oth-
erwise) for these resources?64 
In this sense, "a quality control is an important aspect of the programme development. It is 
also the final step in defence planning cycles which spawn consistently sound products. A 
demand thus exists for impartial inspection by a 'murder board' of objective professionals who 
are familiar with the full spread of opinions and qualified to pick plans apart piece by piece 
before they recommend that sponsors ratify, revise, or revoke."65 
In June of 1996, on the request of the General Military Inspection Directorate, (under the 
President of Ukraine) the 'murder board' of experts was very productive. Many of its recom-
mendations were taken into account. Unfortunately, the final version of the programme had 
not gone through any serious review process, although it has all the necessary signatures on it. 
Needless to say, the President and the members of the National Security and Defence Council 
are not the only representatives of the 'civilian side.' Regarding the role of other civilian play-
ers, involved in the process, it was rather insignificant. Given the lack of civilian experts, the 
Cabinet of Ministers invites the military professionals to maintain 'civilian' control over the 
military. 
For example, Major General Palamarchuk is Head of the State Committee on Defence under 
the Prime Minister; Colonel Aparshyn is Military Advisor to the Prime Minister. Their 
military background helps them to keep the Government informed and to be in touch with the 
military leadership. On the other hand, it is this same military background that inhibits them 
to generate genuinely new ideas, unique approaches or to offer radical solutions. Moreover, it 
is not the Prime Minister, but the President, who takes the initiative and keeps under his 
control (through the NSDC and directly) all the activities related to the military sphere. 
Many people hoped that the new members of the Parliamentary Defence and State Security 
Committee (elected in 1994) would undertake to properly carry out the necessary military re-
forms without leaving this difficult task up to the MOD Board members only. It has not hap-
pened. The role of the current Parliamentary Committee has been limited to participation of 
its leaders in the MOD Board meetings and the NSDC meetings to discuss military issues. 
Both Volodymyr Mukhyn, Chairman of the Committee, and Lieutenant General Adam 
Chykal, his Deputy, are more or less informed about the situation in the Army. 
Unfortunately, they did not urge the Parliament to intervene in the defence planning process. 
They do not seem to be ready to provide the necessary political and financial guidance needed 
to ensure military reform in general and for the reform of the Armed Forces in particular. 
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They did try to call public attention to the inadequate financing of the Army, although it is 
simply not enough under the current circumstances. Moreover, to a certain extent, it is even 
dangerous if the Army gets everything its military leadership 'needs.'66 It is obvious, that the 
method and the formal process of forming the programme have been rather chaotic. 
Fortunately, since May 1996, a few reasonable decisions (the State Expert Commission, the 
Interdepartmental Committee, the MOD Working Group) have been made and put into 
practice. 
As regards the programme's substance – referring to open sources – neither world experience, 
nor own scientific ideas, unfortunately, have been used by the authors. The 'fighting' about 
general force structure, for example, did not even presuppose the establishment of joint com-
mands to combine the efforts of all the military services. None of the structures in considera-
tion (the military districts, the operational-territorial or the operational commands) is assumed 
to have its land, air and naval (marine) components under the single joint command. These 
structures are supposed to be under the Land Forces Command and will consist of pure land 
component. This approach, obsolete by now, has no future. 
Likewise, there is no clear division of authority between the MOD and the General Staff, nor 
between the operational commands and the military services. It is not a matter of lack of time 
(or priorities); it is rather lack of understanding on how important these issues are in the con-
text of the reform of the Armed Forces. How can one plan reforms in communications, com-
mand and control, logistics, acquisition, mobilisation, deployment and employment without 
clear answers to the aforementioned questions? 
Despite the fact that the last version of the programme draft was approved, by the President, 
experts argue that there is no programme yet. Moreover, it is simply impossible to form such 
a programme without a clear vision of the national interests, strategic objectives, national and 
military security strategy; without financial and programme guidance from the civilian side; 
without understanding the substance of missions and tasks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 
Only a systematic approach within a single 'big picture' framework can lead to success. Other-
wise, all future efforts to reform the military sphere and to establish reliable civilian control 
over it, are doomed to failure. Ukraine can just repeat the fruitless reform efforts it has 
already gone through for the last five or six years. 
This analysis shows that the leadership, i.e. 'upper stratum cannot rule in the old way any 
longer.' The lamentable situation in the Army (see Chapter 3) shows that 'lower stratum does 
not want to live in the old way any longer' either. Obviously the current state of affairs cannot 
last forever. Given the lack of civilian experts and sharply decreasing number of military ex-
perts there is an urgent need to start (real) reforms as soon as possible. State leadership simply 
cannot exploit enthusiasm any longer by, producing 'meaningless piles of paper' and 
spreading disappointment among the people involved. Ukraine is doomed either to get a 
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successful result, or to prolong current crisis into an indefinite future with quite predictably 
devastating consequences. 
2.2 Civilian Defence Minister: Unreasoned Or Premature Step? 
 In 1994, there was hope that appointment of Valeriy Shmarov as a civilian Defence Minister, 
would provide a new state of civil-military relations in Ukraine. It turned out to be a failure. 
Today, Ukraine has already the fourth Defence Minister in a few years of independent devel-
opment, not to mention four Chiefs of the General Staff within the same time span. Unfortu-
nately, such political instability provokes a situation when high and middle level authorities 
come and go without any system, any continuity, or any sound results in the long-run. To un-
derstand why Valeriy Shmarov had not justified the hopes, let us return to the summer of 
1994. 
Since Defence Minister General of the Army of Ukraine, Vitaliy Radetskyy, had not been 
very loyal to (newly elected President) Leonid Kuchma, openly campaigning for President 
Kravchuk, his retirement was only a matter of time. The main question was, who would be-
come the third Defence Minister of Ukraine. According to governmental sources,67 the most 
probable candidates for the post were: Colonel General Volodymyr Shkydchenko, Odessa 
Military District Commander; Colonel General Ivan Oliynyk, Deputy Defence Minister 
(Hardware & Armaments); Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata, Chief of the General Staff; and 
Colonel General Vasyl Sobkov, Land Forces Commander. There were also rumours that 
Ukraine could follow Western experience and somebody in the civilian suit would take over 
the Ministry of Defence. These rumours proved to be correct. 
2.2.1 Promising Start 
In August 1994, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry was headed for the first time by a civilian. It 
was generally felt that the Ministry of Defence should be led by a politician with a new way 
of thinking in order to see the prospects of the organisational development of the Armed 
Forces of Ukraine under the conditions of a rule-of-law democratic state. There was no so-
called 'passive resistance' by the military to civilian presence. Everyone knew that Valeriy 
Shmarov, whose previous career was closely connected with the military-industrial complex, 
was a man from the President's team. Instead there was hope for genuine reform in the Armed 
Forces.68Expressing the general feeling of the military servicemen, Anatoliy Smetanin wrote: 
"If he proves to be a man of action, his authority in the Army will be indisputable."69 
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Minister Shmarov viewed the main reason for his appointment as an economic one: "At pres-
ent, the economy is not healthy, and it has its impact on the Army. So, it was the perception 
(of the leadership) that the military should be headed by an individual with economic 
expertise who can balance the state's capabilities and the need to ensure protection of the 
country which prompted my appointment."70 As Valeriy Shmarov pointed out, from now on 
the problems of the military-industrial complex and the Army, will be concentrated in the one 
pair of hands. It was precisely this point which was one of the conditions for his appointment 
to this post.71 The 'industrialist' Valeriy Shmarov was perceived as a man from whom one 
should expect new actions.72 From the very beginning, the new Minister was making quite an 
impression. He frequently and successfully appeared on the international arena to participate 
in intergovernmental negotiations, to visit military units and 'hot spots' in Yugoslavia, to give 
numerous interview and press conferences. Valeriy Shmarov could be easily singled out in 
the crowd, cultivating a new image of the 'power ministry leader.' The facade of the MOD 
looked very inspiring. 
2.2.2 Frustrated Hopes 
Unfortunately, inside the MOD and the Armed Forces little changed during the two years of 
Shmarov's leadership. The newly appointed civilian Defence Minister planned no special 
changes, concerning the development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, because, in his view, 
"Ukrainian Military Doctrine is correct, and it needs no correction whatsoever."73 He was re-
peating the same idea up to his dismissal, while simultaneously trying to develop a 
programme of reforms (?). 
The functions and authority of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff were not divided, 
even on paper. It appeared ludicrous of General Lopata, but it was exactly the Chief of Staff 
who was asking almost every day to draw the line of responsibility. On the one hand, it 
seemed that Minister Shmarov had his own understanding of civil-military relations at the 
very top: 
Indeed, the division of functions is envisaged. The General Staff is a body to draft plans; it de-
velops a concept, a doctrine, and based on its drafts puts forward proposals regarding their res-
olution. My inalienable right, however, is to agree or disagree with its proposal. This right is 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
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even envisaged by the position description that directly specifies that the Chief of the General 
Staff is my First Deputy. If this is so, I am his direct chief. This is obvious.74 
On the other hand, although Valeriy Shmarov was offered different schemes with various ap-
proaches to the MOD and General Staff structures and division of functions and authority be-
tween the MOD and the General Staff, none of them was accepted and put into practice. Con-
cerning disagreements between the civilian Defence Minister and the top military officials, 
Valeriy Shmarov felt their presence and admitted it openly to correspondents: "Not 
everything that was developed by the military experts – although very talented people – over 
decades can now be used for the benefit of the state. But it is not so easy to reject the old, 
which has been tested by practice and experience. Therefore, disagreements emerge, although 
they are of a purely working nature."75 
Rumours of his conflict with Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata were being persistently 
spread. Expressing his personal feeling on how his activities are supported by the entire 
military leadership, Minister Shmarov said: 
This is a difficult question, because military people are special – they are accustomed to saying 
'yes, sir,' but I cannot say what they actually think. But all of them quite explicitly express sup-
port in their words and nods. Work results of specific officials will show. I believe that support 
should be expected from the middle-level officers in local units whose resources and possibili-
ties are limited, and who are hardest hit by the present situation, and need a lot of help. This 
support is very realistic down there. Also, the enlisted servicemen should not be neglected. I 
count on their support.76 
Minister Shmarov had no reasonably sized staff for supervision and tolerated the very scarce 
civilian presence in the MOD. He had not even tried to form a team of like-minded people to 
ensure support for his own plan of reform: "We will not set up new directorates; civilians will 
simply be working in the aforementioned areas."77 In reality, Valeriy Shmarov appointed as 
many as ... two civilians to the influential positions: Anatoliy Dovgopolyy as Deputy Defence 
Minister (Hardware & Armaments) and Olexandr Urban as Head of the (General Staff) For-
eign Relations Department.78 
Minister Shmarov produced nothing likeable to the establishment of a stable, institutionalised, 
sustainable system. Roaming around became sharply visible in all fields. In the final analysis, 
military planning, programming, budgeting and other systems are still in their embryonic 
stage. In February 1996 Valeriy Shmarov recognised that: 
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(t)here are many problems in the Army, as never before in the past... A lack of balance between 
our economic capabilities and the Army's requirements is quite a serious... There is hope that 
all the drawbacks and lack of balance will soon be corrected.79 
In fact, in 1994 he was appointed to lead the Defence Ministry with exactly the same 
objective "to reach a balance between the state's economic capabilities and the Army's 
requirements" which he only hoped to achieve, having spent 18 months in office, and in a less 
favourable situation than in 1994. Little changed in the life of the Armed Forces under his 
leadership. Admitting the fact, Kostyantyn Morozov, the first Ukrainian Defence Minister 
said: "There is an impression that Minister Shmarov, who was in the not so distant past an 
organiser of the conversion in the Armed Forces, is still giving preference to conversion over 
building (the Armed Forces)."80 
The media published numerous allegations against Valeriy Shmarov, concerning the 
enterprise 'UKRINMASH,' run behind-the-scenes by him, engaged in arms trade and 
concerning everybody's neglect of property, military settlements and military units subject to 
liquidation. That property was being pilfered and plundered. There were many attempts to 
cause a scandal around the Defence Minister. Certain members of the Ukrainian Parliament 
repeatedly hinted at a 'kompromat' (discrediting facts) against Valeriy Shmarov, which they 
ostensibly had at their disposal.81 
In his relations with the top military leadership Valeriy Shmarov tried to act not as a 
politician, but more as a military professional. Professional military autonomy was certainly 
beyond the first civilian Defence Minister. Moreover, he often quite openly showed little 
respect to his subordinates in general's rank. Everybody could easily get that impression 
during the MOD meetings and workshops, since he did not even try to hide his feelings. 
Feeling offended, the generals in their turn did not provide the necessary support and 
initiative in all the Minister's undertakings. Out of distrust to even the Chief of the General 
Staff – the highest ranking military professional, he never decided to transfer the operational 
control of the Armed Forces to Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata. 
Relying on the strong personal support of President Kuchma, in February 1996, Valeriy 
Shmarov finally replaced Anatoliy Lopata and (even without the Parliamentary approval) got 
a new Chief of the General Staff – Lieutenant General Olexandr Zatynayko, who was 
Commander of one of the Army Corps. Nevertheless, for over six months the Defence 
Minister was not able to take advantage of such a favourable civil-military 'balance.' 
                                                 
79 I. Kovtonyuk, 'Due to the 'Conditional' Training of Ukrainian Troops, It Is Difficult To Form Even a Tank 
Battalion of Peacekeepers,' Kiev UKRAYINA MOLODA in Ukrainian, 16 February 1996, p. 3. 
80 Colonel General (Retired) K. Morozov, Explosion to Dictation, Kiev UKRAYINSKA HAZETA in Ukrain-
ian, No. 2 (84), 18 January 1996, p. 1. 
81 See, for instance: G. Nikolayev, Plot Against Valeriy Shmarov? Opponents of the Civilian Defence Minister 
Launch an Onslaught,' Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian, 19 July 1995, pp. 1-3 or Report of the 
INTELEKT Agency: Ukraine and Weapons, Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian, 18 August 1995, 
FBIS-SOV-95-162. 
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2.2.3 Belated Removal 
The lack of the personal culture appropriate for such a high position,82 lack of the necessary 
knowledge and experience in military matters, and also his inability to find common language 
even with his closest entourage, resulted into serious mistakes and improper decisions. In 
addition, Minister Shmarov was not able to establish stable working relationship with 
members of the Parliamentary Defence and State Security Committee, nor with leaders of the 
political parties and factions in the Parliament.83 
As a matter of fact, the decision to appoint a civilian to lead the MOD in 1994 was not prema-
ture, rather, the situation was extremely favourable. The decision was rather unreasoned in a 
sense, that not only a civilian person, but also civilian personality should have been chosen 
for the post. In short, the final result was predetermined by Shmarov's lack of vision, his 
inability to understand the substance of the mutually beneficial division of authority between 
the two (civilian and military) leaders, inability and even unwillingness to create a team of 
support in the MOD, and the last but not least – by lack of personal culture appropriate for 
such a high position, Valeriy Shmarov was replaced in July 1996. His removal from the post 
was obvious, understandable, predictable and rather belated.84 
Instead of a civil-military imbalance, new military-military balance was formed at the top of 
the Defence Ministry. Two Lieutenant Generals – two namesakes (Olexandr Ivanovich 
Kuzmuk and Olexandr Ivanovich Zatynayko), both men of action, both ready to work hard, 
day and night, to improve the situation in the Armed Forces. However, both were lacking 
experience at such a high state level and thus started with a deficiency in the relay-race. 
2.3 Professional Army: Distant Future? 
The State programme for the build-up and development of the Armed Forces, which President 
Kuchma signed on 18 January 1997, envisages a correlation of about 50-50 between contract 
servicemen and draftees by the year 2005. One could argue that these figures have no 
scientific or economic substantiation, they rather reflect a wish to get rid of all the problems 
which resulted from the draft. 
The issue of running the conscript system in Ukraine is very painful and rather complex. In 
response to the sharp shortfall of conscripts in 1992-1993, the period of conscription was 
once again raised to two years, although under public pressure and through military initiative 
                                                 
82 Substantiated rumours about his affection towards alcohol circulated in the Army since his very appoint-
ment. 
83 For more on this issue see in : Major General (Retired) V. Grechaninov, 'Who Will Protect the Minister of 
Defence?,' Kiev REGION in Russian, 30 July 1996, p. 8. 
84 Looking to the future, one would say, that despite this unsuccessful attempt, the military would still welcome 
a civilian Defence Minister. The only requirement is his strong personality. 
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of April 1996, the legislator re-established a service term of eighteen months.85 The following 
disturbing data were presented by the General Staff.86 
In 1995 about 14,000 conscripts refused to join the Armed Forces and in 1996 the number 
reached 18,000. Existing legislation does not have provisions to bring them to trial, therefore 
there have been only 13 court cases so far. There are different reasons for the shortage of con-
scripts. Because of existing exemptions, only 20-30 % of each year group is liable for the 
call-up. Of those, almost one third is rejected on medical grounds. The reluctance to serve is 
evident and entirely understandable. There is a general feeling among the population that the 
military lacks prestige and that service is a waste of time. Most often quoted reasons for 
avoiding the draft are dedovshchina (recruit hazing), the hardships of military life and lack of 
provision for servicemen and their families in the event of injury or death. 
Not only quantitative, but also qualitative measures of the conscripts are alarming. The Law 
'On Universal Military Obligation and Military Service' is known to have quite a few 
shortcomings.87 According to this law, virtually all students in higher education can postpone 
their military service. Thus, the Army is deprived of the better educated men that used to fill 
most of important positions. For the last three years a percentage of conscripts, that have a 
high school diploma, decreased from 87.5% in 1994 to 66.5% in 1996. Moreover, 10,266 
conscripts have been already taken to court and more than 46,000 have health problems. 
Among those who might enter the Armed Forces in 1997 more than 27,000 do not have high 
school diploma and 1,577 have only elementary school level of education.88 
According to former Defence Minister Valeriy Shmarov, virtually only village boys are 
joining the Army. Ukraine has become literally the Army of "poor workers and peasants." As 
a result, the social composition of the military does not reflect the social composition of 
society as was the case during the Soviet period. The soldiers, who mostly represent the 
poorest stratum of Ukrainian society, have neither a will nor motivation to protect the richest 
stratum, whose sons of the same age instead of serving in the Army enjoy their lives and drive 
expensive (US $40,000-60,000) cars.89 
                                                 
85 This was already the third change in the term of conscript military service since 1991 – a year and a half, two 
years, and now a year and a half again. It turned out that the previous (two years) decision was mistaken and 
unwarranted. Given the demographic situation, the size of the Armed Forces (370,000) and the stipulated 
size of other armed structures, less than a third of the draftees would be taken into the ranks if the term of 
service was not reduced. As one can understand, there could be numerous abuses on a local military 
authority level. 
86 V. Kovalskyy, Valentyn, 'Army Loses Combat Capability Without Patriotic Upbringing,' Kiev NARODNA 
ARMIYA in Ukrainian, 19 February 1997, p. 1. At the same time, every year and exclusively from the Cri-
mean city of Sevastopol, more than 150 school graduates enter Russian military academies; therefore they 
are 'lost' for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 
87 Twenty-six additional corrections have been already prepared by the Defence Ministry. They pertain, by and 
large, to Article 17 (deferments from the draft). 
88 Kovalskyy, 'Army Loses Combat Capability...,' NARODNA ARMIYA, p. 2. 
89 A few figures help to understand the difference: The state earmarks only H158 for the monthly maintenance 
of one compulsory service soldier, of which the latter receives H16 in cash. Only 40-60% of military uni-
form supplies were provided for the Army last year. 
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Qualitative factors and morale also greatly impair combat readiness of the Armed Forces. Un-
fortunately, morale and discipline are generally low. According to the statistics, for only ten 
months of 1996 there were 3,000 crimes in the Armed Forces.90 To a certain extent, this is be-
cause the Armed Forces reflect trends within society; disillusion, despair, distrust and disre-
spect for any authority. As General Martyrosyan put it: 
the system – based on the principle 'I am the boss, you are the fool' – relies on repressive forms 
of relations with subordinates rather than on behaviour norms accepted in normal societies. 
This system prevents a person from being himself and forces him to give up his principles.91 
If order can be instilled in the Army only by dictatorial methods and threats, this will be a 
temporary and frail order. As Chinese say, 'one cannot stand on tiptoes very long. In the 
General's view, a military sub-unit based on such an order will fall apart in the very first 
trial.92 
The Armed Forces of Ukraine suffer from low public support, although this is quite under-
standable. Nobody would tolerate such a state of affairs when "every year in the Ukrainian 
Army (without any war) one battalion of soldiers dies, one company commits suicide, and 
two regiments become disabled."93 As a result, the Armed Forces are caught in a vicious 
circle: 
Low support translates into low budgets and conscription laws which exempt many of the best 
potential recruits. Low quality personnel and limited resources for training and modernising the 
forces results in poor performance. This poor performance, which might include indiscipline, 
abuse of soldiers, and unsafe or insanitary living or working conditions, gives the armed forces 
a bad name. This poor reputation leads to a further erosion in public and political support for 
the military.94 
Some interesting ideas on how Ukraine could improve its conscript system were presented by 
Lieutenant General Olexandr Ihnatenko, a member of the Parliamentary Defence Committee 
and former Head of MOD Main Personnel Directorate. He is certain: 
in the current situation it is simply impossible for Ukrainian citizens to obey the Law 'On Uni-
versal Military Obligation and Military Service in Ukraine,' even if they want to. Ukraine plans 
to keep the Armed Forces on 350,000 level, that means approximately 270,000 soldiers' slots. 
Given the population of the country that predetermines the size of the draft contingent; the 18-
month term of the military service; the 'letter' of the Law 'On Alternative (non-military) Service 
in Ukraine' that stipulates only religious reasons for such a service, one can easily conclude that 
under those circumstances there will be always a substantial surplus of conscripts.95 
                                                 
90 For more data see, for instance: G. Kluchikov, 'Ukrainian Army Is Overflowed by Criminal Wave,' Kiev 
KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian, 27 July 1996, p. 4. 
91 Martyrosyan, 'What Kind of Minister...,' Kiev VECHIRNIY KYYIV, p. 2. 
92 Ibid. 
93 V. Luganskiy, 'Stand up' for the Military Reform, Kiev REGION in Russian, 30 July-6 August 1996, p. 1. 
94 Major A. Zaccor, Problems in the Baltic Armed Forces, Conflict Studies Research Centre of The Royal 
Military Academy Sandhurst Camberley, Surrey, September 1994. 
95 Lieutenant General O. Ihnatenko, 'Everybody Must Serve In the Army,' Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in 
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In fact, today only 11.5% of young men become soldiers.96 As a result of this imbalance, 
there are a lot of tricks and bribes involved in running the conscript system.97 To balance the 
system, General Ihnatenko offers different options: first, shorter term of military service (12-
month term seems to be the minimum considering the complexity of weapons and level of 
training required); secondly, wider eligibility criteria for alternative service; thirdly, different 
approaches to reserve components' manning. 
General Ihnatenko's article carries a very clear title: "Everybody Must Serve In the Army." In 
fact, he echoes Defence Minister Kuzmuk who has told the media: "As a patriot, citizen, and 
serviceman, I am deeply convinced that everybody should serve in the Armed Forces."98 
While the generals continue to look for solutions how to involve more people in the service, 
there is another – more radical – solution that envisages fewer people serving in the Armed 
Forces. Among the possible options is one in which further promotion of the contract of 
service should not be excluded. Increasing the professional element in the Armed Forces 
could also raise the ability of the military personnel to cope with the growing complexity of 
the modern weapon systems. 
As for the future of manpower acquisition policy, the issue of a professional Army is being 
widely considered by society. The experts' point of view corresponds to that of the public – 
84% for professional service, 16% for preserving the draft. The point of view of almost every 
sixth military expert still in favour of preserving the draft says they are not reluctant to 
support a completely professional Armed Force, but prefer to give priority to the tackling of 
other problems under the heavy pressure of insufficient financing.99 
Meanwhile, it seems that Ukraine is still far away from obtaining their professional Armed 
Forces. There are currently about 30,000 contract servicemen in the Army. As a rule, these 
are re-enlisted servicemen. Moreover, as it turns out, almost two thirds of all contract 
servicemen are ... 'servicewomen.' Men are not coming in under contract because little pay 
and the appropriate conditions are lacking. 
One may certainly say, that service under contract is not yet justifying itself in Ukraine. The 
subject being raised in some cases is that it is not worth increasing the number of contract sol-
diers. For what purpose? For the tank commander, gunner and driver to be professionals. 
                                                 
96 In 1994-1995 the percentage was even lower. The former Defence Minister Valeriy Shmarov was quite 
indignant about these numbers: 'There is the Law 'On Universal Military Obligation and Military Service in 
Ukraine.' This is a paradox. Is it really universal if only 10% of young men of draft age join the Army? We 
need the Law simply 'On Military Service in Ukraine.' 
97 The Government tries to impose different restrictive regulations. For instance, to strengthen responsibility of 
the local medical commissions, representatives from the Procurator's office and from the Security Service 
have taken part in their work since 1996. As a result, the number of 'ill' draftees declined in 1996 compared 
to 1995. Despite the reports of 'success,' these measures are rather short-term solutions. 
98 O. Vaulina, 'By Reducing Our Ranks, We Are Mobilising!,' ZERKALO NEDELI in Russian, 26 October-1 
November 1996, p. 4. 
99 Problems of the Armed Forces and the Military-Industrial Complex of Ukraine and Civilian Control over 
Their Activities, Report of Ukrainian Centre for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies (Kiev 
1996). 
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They would serve longer and would take care of the hardware and weaponry. But that is not 
what has happened. The costs are higher than the gains and the turnover of the contract 
personnel is very high therein. The MOD takes in as many people under contract over a year 
as it discharges. 
Opponents of the professional Army argue about the better quality of the reserve formations 
once the conscript system is in place. However, the Ministry of Defence gives quite opposite 
data: 
The reserve formations of Ukrainian Armed Forces are manned at 68.5% with category one (re-
serve) servicemen, and 31.5% with category two and three servicemen. The divisions are only 
21% manned with category one servicemen who completed their conscript service less than 13-
15 years ago.100 
That is to say, taking into account the cutbacks in the Army, the quality of manpower acquisi-
tion declines while the average age of the military reservists sharply increases in Ukraine. 
A trend towards an expansion of contract service is not expected in the near future. Lack of fi-
nances prevents the MOD from increasing the number of contract servicemen. It makes no 
sense to serve in the Army for the same wage as an unskilled worker. Major General Vitaliy 
Kuksenko, Chief of the Main Organisational-Mobilisation Directorate and Deputy Chief of 
the General Staff, believes: 
economics, and not our desires and emotions, are in charge of this process. The state does not 
have the capability of paying a decent wage, so no one is going for the contracts. The economic 
situation does not permit the development of army professionalism in the way that was 
expected.101 
It is worth reminding the reader, that the State programme for build-up and development of 
the Armed Forces of Ukraine till the year 2005 provides for a 50-50 correlation between con-
tract servicemen and draftees. On the scale of History the year 2005 is in the not too distant 
future. 
Conclusions 
1. Despite some real changes for the last 5-6 years, civil-military relations are still far from 
optimal in Ukraine. It seems, that facing the whole spectrum of other urgent and complex 
problems, civilian leadership of the country is not ready and therefore does not fully accept 
democratic civilian control over its military. 
                                                 
100 Lieutenant General O. Ihnatenko, 'How To Meet Mobilisation Requirements: Some Views on the Issues of 
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2. Gaps in legislative basis, absence of clear priorities in domestic and foreign policy, zigzag 
efforts in reforming the Army, permanent political turbulence gives the military an oppor-
tunity to manoeuvre between the Parliament and the executive structures. 
3. The programme for the Armed Forces build-up and development has become kind of test 
of maturity of civil-military relations in Ukraine. Numerous efforts to form the programme 
without the national and military security strategy; without financial and programme guid-
ance from the civilian side; without understanding the substance of missions and tasks of 
the Ukrainian Armed Forces have proved to be useless in the final analysis. 
4. The dimensional aspect of Ukraine's military structure seems to be unique and very impor-
tant. Ukraine has almost a million of armed people and only about 370,000 of them serve 
in the Armed Forces. The other military structures – the National Guard, the Border 
Troops, the Civil Defence formations, the Security Service, the Interior Troops, and so 
forth – have missions and tasks that overlap with those of the Armed Forces. It is obvious, 
that under the pressure of limited resources one cannot reform the Armed Forces without 
redistribution of missions and tasks among other aforementioned structures of the State 
military organisation of Ukraine. 
5. Although Ukraine for the last 5-6 years has succeeded in making of many constitutional 
and institutional arrangements for democratic civilian control over the Armed Forces, 
these arrangements present rather form in itself. The next step must be filling the form with 
an appropriate substance. One can do it only by applying a scientific (or at least 
systematic) approach. Therefore, it is of great importance for Ukraine to develop a 
methodology (whenever possible up to the checklist level) for the reforming of its Armed 
Forces and establishing of reliable democratic civilian control over the military sphere. 
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Summary 
Introductory Remarks 
As an active participant in the 'Partnership for Peace' programme, Ukraine has committed 
itself to a 'transparency' in some key areas of civil-military relations and defence. However, 
the country has little valuable information to share among the partners, because its military 
planning, programming and budgeting systems are still in their embryonic stage. Moreover, 
the civilian leadership of Ukraine is not ready and therefore does not fully accept democratic 
civilian control over military. This study is devoted to analysing of different aspects of civil-
military relations and defence reform in Ukraine. The study reveals a very important 
dimensional aspect of civil-military relations in Ukraine: existing in parallel to the Armed 
Forces a few other armed structures create many additional obstacles on the path of 
establishing an affordable and sustainable military structure. The paper contains vast factual 
material that helps to follow the development of events between 1991 and 1996. Analysis of 
the material allows to single out some trends, tendencies, and contradictions, invisible at first 
sight. The role of the key players and personalities, involved in the defence planning process, 
is being revealed. The research is based on a number of official references and numerous 
Ukrainian, Russian, and Western original sources. 
Findings 
1. Relationships along the civilian-military axis are still far from optimal in Ukraine. In 
reality, civilian leadership is not ready and therefore does not fully accept democratic 
civilian control. 
2. Lack of constitutional clarity, absence of certain priorities in domestic and foreign policy 
and numerous gaps in the legislative base, create a space for manoeuvre for the military 
between the executive structures and the Parliament. 
3. The programme for the Armed Forces build-up and development has become the focus of 
civil-military relations in Ukraine. It is impossible to form the programme without the na-
tional and military security strategy; without financial and programme guidance from the 
civilian side; without understanding the substance of missions and tasks of the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces. 
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4. The dimensional aspect of Ukraine's military structure seems to be extremely important. 
Ukraine is in a much more difficult situation than other European countries are. It has al-
most a million of armed people and only about 370,000 of them serve in the Armed 
Forces. The other military structures – the National Guard, the Border Troops, the Civil 
Defence formations, the Security Service, the Interior Troops, and so forth – have missions 
and tasks that overlap with those of the Armed Forces. It is unwise to reform only the 
Armed Forces without some redistribution of missions and tasks and without optimising 
the whole State military organisation of Ukraine. 
5. Although for the last 5-6 years most of the necessary constitutional and institutional ar-
rangements for democratic civilian control over the Armed Forces have been completed in 
Ukraine, they currently present form in itself. There is an urgent need to fill the form with 
appropriate substance or, in other words, to 'inhale life' in it. Only then one could expect 
that in the years ahead Ukraine will be able to establish and run a workable and sustainable 
system of reliable democratic civilian control over the military. 
6. One can fill the form of civil-military relations with substance only by applying a scientific 
(or at least systematic) approach to building the system. Therefore, it is of paramount im-
portance for Ukraine to develop a methodology (whenever possible up to the checklist lev-
el) for the reforming of the Armed Forces and the establishing of reliable democratic ci-
vilian control over the military. 
 
